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ESSAY 
ANTITRUST’S UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICS 
Daniel A. Crane* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust law stands at its most fluid and negotiable moment in a 
generation. The bipartisan consensus that antitrust should solely focus 
on economic efficiency and consumer welfare has quite suddenly come 
under attack from prominent voices calling for a dramatically enhanced 
role for antitrust law in mediating a variety of social, economic, and 
political friction points, including employment, wealth inequality, data 
privacy and security, and democratic values. To the bewilderment of 
many observers, the ascendant pressures for antitrust reforms are 
flowing from both wings of the political spectrum, throwing into 
confusion a conventional understanding that pro-antitrust sentiment 
tacked left and antitrust laissez faire tacked right. 
On the left, the assault on the consumer-welfare-oriented status quo 
has migrated from reformist organizations like the Open Markets 
Institute1 and anti-corporate progressives like senator Elizabeth Warren 
and the House Democratic Leadership, which has staked the 2018 mid-
 
* Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.   
 1 Open Markets, https://perma.cc/G35H-LAFH (last visited Aug 23, 2018). Open Markets 
was affiliated with the left-leaning New America Foundation, until forced out over Open 
Markets’s criticisms of Google, a New America patron. Kenneth P. Vogel, Google Critic 
Ousted from Think Tank Funded by the Tech Giant, N.Y. Times (Aug. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/eric-schmidt-google-new-america.html. 
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term elections on an economic platform including antitrust reform as a 
centerpiece.2 In the Democratic Party’s center, the formation of a House 
Antitrust Caucus3 and reform bills introduced in both the House4 and the 
Senate5 underscore increasing political traction to jettison the consumer-
welfare status quo. The Democrats’ “Better Deal” plan asserts that 
consumers are but one of the classes that antitrust should protect, with 
workers, suppliers, and small business taking an equal place in the 
protected class.6 Significantly, the document launches harsh criticisms of 
the past thirty years of antitrust enforcement as excessively lax—a 
period over which Democrats ran antitrust enforcement just over half of 
the time.7 The Democratic leadership has made clear that it does not 
intend to exclude the Clinton and Obama administrations from its 
criticism, and that it intends to advocate a major trans-partisan 
rethinking of antitrust policy.8 
On the right, President Trump has attacked concentrated economic 
power in technology and big media,9 and his Justice Department 
launched a surprising, aggressive challenge to the AT&T–Time Warner 
vertical merger (the district court rejected the Administration’s challenge 
to the merger on substantive antitrust grounds and the case is now on 
 
 2 U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Leadership, A Better Deal: Crack Down on 
Corporate Monopolies & the Abuse of Economic and Political Power, https://perma.cc/25G 
M-QFJX. 
 3 Tess Townsend, Keith Ellison and the New ‘Antitrust Caucus’ Want to Know Exactly 
How Bad Mergers Have Been for the American Public, N.Y. Mag. (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/JE3W-THHS. 
 4 21st Century Competition Commission Act of 2017, H.R. 4686, 115th Cong. (2017), 
https://perma.cc/JE3W-THHS; Merger Retrospective Act of 2017, H.R. 4538, 115th Cong. 
(2017), https://perma.cc/6CW7-QNCC.  
 5 Merger Enforcement Improvement Act, S. 1811, 115th Cong. (2017), https://perma.cc/ 
H9XS-GSUH. 
 6 U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Leadership, supra note 2.   
 7 Id. 
 8 Chuck Schumer, A Better Deal for American Workers, N.Y. Times (July 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/opinion/chuck-schumer-employment-democrats.html 
(“Democrats have too often hesitated from taking on those misguided policies directly and 
unflinchingly — so much so that many Americans don’t know what we stand for.”).  
 9 Trump Says Amazon has ‘a huge antitrust problem,’ CNBC (May 13, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/2SYD-W6HF; Trump’s comments create a lose-lose position for Justice, 
Wash. Post (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-comments-
create-a-lose-lose-position-for-justice/2017/11/13/6fd7b28e-c596-11e7-aae0-
cb18a8c29c65_story.html?utm_term=.3fa9eb549b54. 
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appeal).10 Trump’s trustbusting might be dismissed as a feature of his 
idiosyncratic populism or, less charitably, abusive vendettas against 
corporate political foes like CNN and Amazon, but the reformist 
sentiment on the right is far from limited to the President. Similar 
sentiments have been expressed by diverse conservative figures such as 
activist Steve Bannon, who wants to turn Google and Facebook into 
public utilities,11 conservative economist Kenneth Rogoff,12 and 
Trump’s decided political foe Bill Kristol, who criticizes Robert Bork’s 
consumer-welfare standard and proposed a significant reinvigoration of 
the antitrust laws to limit the growing power of tech’s Big Five 
(Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft).13 The American 
Conservative recently turned with surprising ferocity on that 
conservative icon Bork, asserting that “[w]hereas prior generations of 
lawmakers protected the American citizenry as businessmen, 
entrepreneurs, and growers, Bork led a revolution that sacrificed the 
small producer at the altar of efficiency and cheap goods.”14 
Standing against the anti-incumbent challengers from both political 
wings is a broad, bi-partisan establishment center seeking to defend the 
consumer-welfare framework. Until recently, this establishment center 
seemed far from unified. Since the rise of the Chicago School in the 
1970s, antitrust law has been contested on terms that seemed generally 
to track left–right political ideology, with those on the left favoring more 
aggressive intervention and those on the right more laissez faire.15 But 
the rising tide of calls for a radically different version of antitrust has led 
to a circling of establishment wagons around the consumer-welfare 
standard. Left-leaning organizations that once led the charge for more 
aggressive enforcement now find themselves defending the consumer-
welfare idea in principle, even while calling for more aggressive 
 
 10 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 
18-5214 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2018). 
 11 Robinson Meyer, What Steve Bannon Wants to Do to Google, The Atlantic (Aug. 1, 
2017), https://perma.cc/ZL8L-7URB. 
 12 John Kehoe, Kenneth Rogoff Concerned by the Dark Side of the Technology 
Revolution, Fin. Rev. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/94G5-HY8W. 
 13 The New Center, Ideas to Re-Center America 10–17, https://perma.cc/L9H6-6QY2. 
 14 Daniel Kishi, Robert Bork’s America, The Am. Conservative (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/KD9E-YLGT. 
 15 See generally How The Chicago School Overshot the Mark: the Effect of Conservative 
Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (presenting arguments, 
generally from “the left,” against reigning Chicago School orthodoxy). 
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enforcement within that paradigm.16 Meanwhile, conventionally 
conservative or pro-business leaning organizations continue to defend 
the consumer-welfare standard against assaults from their own right 
flank.17 
This Essay shows that, although unconventional in presentist terms, 
the emerging political dislocations over antitrust policy reflect 
longstanding ideological ambiguities about and within the antimonopoly 
tradition. In particular, the current political fracturing over antitrust is 
best understood by examining three ideological friction points that have 
emerged periodically within American history: (1) the ideological 
ambiguity surrounding the association between large scale in business 
and large scale in government; (2) the shifting meaning of “monopoly” 
from the exclusive grant of government privilege to purely private 
power, and a related question about the sources of monopoly power; and 
(3) pragmatic concerns about the ability of the capitalist order to survive 
without regulatory interventions to smooth its roughest edges. Taken in 
the context of these longstanding friction points, the strange-bedfellow 
coalitions uneasily rising around contemporary antitrust reform aren’t 
that strange at all. 
 
I. THE IDEOLOGICAL AMBIGUITY OF LARGE SCALE IN GOVERNMENT AND 
BUSINESS 
A. Brandeis and Bork as Ideological Touchpoints 
 
Although American antitrust policy has been influenced by a wide 
variety of ideological schools,18 two influences stand out as historically 
 
 16 See Danny Vinik, Inside the New Battle Against Google, Politico (Sept. 17, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/G9JV-77WL (reporting on resistance to Open Markets’ assault on the 
consumer-welfare standard by traditionally left-leaning, pro-enforcement groups like 
American Antitrust Institute and New America Foundation). 
 17 See, e.g.  ¸ Federalist Soc’y Regulatory Transparency Project, Antitrust & Consumer 
Protection Working Group, https://perma.cc/JSM3-2NYB (defending the consumer-welfare 
standard); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Competition Policy & Antitrust, https://perma.cc/ 
52L2-6ZHV (“Antitrust remedies should enhance consumer welfare and make sense in an 
interconnected world.”). 
 18 See generally Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Making of Competition 
Policy: Legal and Economic Sources (2013) (summarizing the intellectual influences that 
have shaped competition policy). 
COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
122 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 104:118 
most significant to understanding the contemporary antitrust debate. The 
first is a Brandeisian school, epitomized in the title of Louis Brandeis’ 
1914 essay (subsequently made the title of a 1934 collection of his 
essays) in Harper’s Weekly: A Curse of Bigness.19 Arguing for 
“regulated competition” over “regulated monopoly,” Brandeis asserted 
that it was necessary to “curb[] physically the strong, to protect those 
physically weaker” in order to sustain industrial liberty.20 Brandeis 
evoked a Jeffersonian vision of a social-economic order organized on a 
small scale, with atomistic competition between a large number of 
equally advantaged units. In particular, he criticized industrial 
consolidation on economic, social, and political grounds.21 As explained 
in a dissenting opinion by William O. Douglas in the 1948 case of 
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., Brandeis worried that “size can 
become a menace—both industrial and social. It can be 
an industrial menace because it creates gross inequalities against 
existing or putative competitors. It can be a social menace—because of 
its control of prices.”22  
The Brandeisian vision held sway in U.S. antitrust law from the 
Progressive Era through the early 1970s, albeit with significant 
interruptions.23 Its spirit animates a long chain of important cases from 
Chicago Board of Trade24 in 1918 (authored by Brandeis himself) to 
Topco in 1972,25 and a string of Congressional reforms including the 
Clayton26 and Federal Trade Commission Acts of 1914,27 the Robinson–
Patman Act of 1938,28 and the Celler–Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950.29  
 
 19 Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, Harper’s Wkly., Jan. 10, 1914, at 18. 
 20 Louis D. Brandeis, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition? (1934), reprinted in 
Crane & Hovenkamp, supra note 18 at 185. On Brandeis’ influence in antitrust, see generally 
Kenneth G. Elzinga & Micah Webber, Louis Brandeis and Contemporary Antitrust 
Enforcement, 33 Touro L. Rev. 277 (2017). 
 21 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Curse of Bigness, The Atl. (June 3, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/6QQG-GQS5 (summarizing Brandeis’ vision). 
 22 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535–36 (1948) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  
 23 See, e.g., Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in 
Economic Ambivalence 3–16 (1995) (detailing the place of Brandeisian School among 
prevailing New Deal ideologies). 
 24 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
 25 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).  
 26 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012). 
 27 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
 28 Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012). 
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The ascendant Chicago School of the 1960s and 70s threw down the 
gauntlet to the Brandeisian tendency of U.S. antitrust law. In an early 
mission statement, Robert Bork and Ward Bowman characterized 
antitrust history as “vacillat[ing] between the policy of preserving 
competition and the policy of preserving competitors from their more 
energetic and efficient rivals,”30 the latter being an interpretation of the 
Brandeis School. Richard Posner struck a similar note in his 1976 book 
on antitrust, asserting that “the proper purpose of the antitrust laws is to 
promote competition, as that term is understood in economics.”31 
Chicagoans argued that antitrust law should be concerned solely with 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare32 (more on these values in a 
moment). “Bigness” was no longer necessarily a curse, but often the 
product of superior efficiency. Chicago criticized Brandeis’ “sympathy 
for small, perhaps inefficient, traders who might go under in fully 
competitive markets.”33 Preserving a level playing field meant stifling 
efficiency to enable market participation by the mediocre.34   
Beginning in 1977–78, the Chicago School achieved an almost 
complete triumph in the Supreme Court, at least in the limited sense that 
the Court came to adopt the economic efficiency/consumer welfare 
model as the exclusive or near-exclusive goal of antitrust law. (Adoption 
of Chicago School interpretations of consumer welfare and policy 
positions on particular competitive practices would occur neither 
immediately nor completely.)35 In 1979, citing Bork, the Court declared 
that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare 
 
 29 Act of December 29, 1950 (Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act), 64 Stat. 1125–26, 15 
U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 30 Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363, 
363–64 (1965). 
 31 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective ix (1976). 
 32 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 9 (1978). 
 33 Id. at 41. 
 34 Id. at 137 (“Any firm that operates excludes rivals from some share of the market. 
Superior efficiency forecloses. Indeed, exclusion or foreclosure is the mechanism by which 
competition confers its benefits upon society. The more efficient exclude the less efficient 
from the control of resources, and they do so only to the degree that their efficiency is 
superior.”). Years later, as a paid consultant for Netscape against Microsoft, Bork employed 
the level-playing-field metaphor affirmatively, asserting, “The object is to create a level 
playing field benefiting consumers. That is what antitrust is about . . . .” Robert H. 
Bork, What Antitrust Is All About, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1998, at A19.   
 35 See Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1911, 1922 (2009). 
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prescription.’”36 Over time, the maxim that antitrust law should protect 
“competition rather than competitors” became canonical.37 Brandeis had 
been displaced by Bork. 
If the last three or four decades of U.S. antitrust policy have largely 
belonged to Bork—at least at an ideological level—the Bork-versus-
Brandeis dichotomy is far from settled. The voices at the cutting edge of 
the rising reformist movement—particularly those aligned with the 
influential Open Markets Institute—explicitly style themselves as a 
“New Brandeis” school in order to re-up the historic contest between the 
Brandeisian and Chicago School orders.38  
 
II. THE LINGERING SHADOWS OF JEFFERSONIANISM AND 
HAMILTONIANISM 
Although it is conventional to understand Brandeis’s anti-bigness 
ideology as an aspect of Progressivism standing in contrast to Chicago’s 
big-business conservatism, the story is historically more nuanced. 
Brandeis’s preoccupation with “bigness” was not limited to large 
corporate scale. He was also deeply concerned with large governmental 
scale generally, and a large-scale federal government in particular. As 
Jeffrey Rosen has observed, “Denouncing big banks as well as big 
government as symptoms of what he called a ‘curse of bigness,’ 
Brandeis was determined to diminish concentrated financial and federal 
power, which he viewed as a menace to liberty and democracy.”39 
Brandeis styled himself a Jeffersonian, and his ideology resonated with 
the Jeffersonian preference for small-scale yeomanry and localized 
political organization.40  
 
 36 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 
supra note 32 at 66). 
 37 E.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 
(1993) (“It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition, 
not competitors.’”) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). 
 38 David Dayen, This Budding Movement Wants to Smash Monopolies, The Nation (April 
4, 2017), https://perma.cc/7ZMB-XHVM; Vinik, supra note 16; see also Matt Stoller 
(@matthewstoller), Twitter (Jul. 9, 2018, 9:29 AM), https://perma.cc/P22E-U2EY (showing 
a leading member of Open Markets self-identifying the organization as “neo-Brandeis”). 
 39 Rosen, supra note 21; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Louis D. Brandeis: American Prophet 1 
(2016) (discussing Brandeis’ concern with big corporations and centralization of government 
power under the New Deal). 
 40 Alfred Lief, Brandeis: The Personal History of an American Ideal 478 (1936). 
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In lionizing large corporate scale, the Chicago School aligned itself 
with the Hamiltonian vision for a robustly mercantile society grounded 
on powerful financial and economic institutions. By doing so, Chicago 
always risked alienating the libertarian right, with its affinity for 
Jefferson’s vision for small-scale government and industrial production.41 
Many libertarians have found it hard to attack bloated government 
without also worrying about bloated business (witness the rise of the Tea 
Party, which arose in large part as a reaction to corporate bailouts). 
Influential libertarians like Friedrich Hayek saw a role for antitrust law 
in curbing monopolistic abuses because they understand unfettered 
corporate power as a threat to personal liberty.42 
The divide between the competing Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian 
ideals on organizational scale and their implications for efficiency and 
liberty thread through antitrust’s intellectual and ideological history, 
often disrupting conventional political alignments. Teddy Roosevelt, a 
deep admirer of Hamilton, was comfortable with large scale in both 
government and business. Far from a “trustbuster,” Roosevelt opposed 
breaking up Standard Oil, viewing large aggregations of capital as 
inevitable and necessary—so long as superintended by a strong federal 
government.43 Roosevelt’s affinity for large-scale government and 
business earned him the epithet of “socialist.”44 That charge was 
hyperbolic, but not directionally implausible. In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, American socialists looked with suspicion on 
the antitrust laws because they viewed the rise of the Gilded Age trusts 
as salutary stepping stones to government appropriation of the means of 
production and industry.45 Socialist Presidential candidate Eugene Debs, 
himself the defendant in an antitrust prosecution, argued: “Monopoly is 
certain and sure. It is merely a question of whether we will be 
collectively owned monopolies, for the good of the race, or whether they 
 
 41 Rosen, Louis D. Brandeis: American Prophet, supra note 39, at 10–14; see also Albert 
Joy Nock, Jefferson (1983). 
 42 Ellen Frankel Paul, Hayek on Monopoly and Antitrust in the Crucible of United States 
v. Microsoft, 1 N.Y.U. J. Law & Liberty 167, 174–80 (2005).  
 43 See Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur B. Farquhar (Aug. 11, 1911), in 
Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches 652 (Louis Auchincloss ed., 2004). 
 44 Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916, at 
344–46 (1988). 
 45 See generally Henry Rand Hatfield, The Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 4 
(1899) (reporting that some socialists favored consolidation as a means to nationalization). 
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will be privately owned for the power, pleasure and glory of the 
Morgans, Rockefellers, Guggenheims, and Carnegies.”46  
Conversely, influential conservatives in antitrust’s formative era 
favored aggressive antitrust enforcement as an antidote to the 
simultaneous aggrandizement of government and business. In the 
crucible election of 1912, William Howard Taft argued against 
Progressive proposals to create a new Federal Trade Commission, 
asserting that his administration’s aggressive enforcement record 
demonstrated how traditional prosecutorial and common-law processes 
could obviate the need to create new large governmental organizations 
to combat big business.47 Taft’s pro-enforcement saber rattling reached 
such a crescendo that Wall Street began to wonder whether Roosevelt 
might be the candidate more sympathetic to their interests. 48 
The New Deal, too, saw the Democratic Party equivocate between 
contending Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian impulses on the question of 
governmental and business scale. The first New Deal period—from 
1933 to early 1935—was dominated by the National Industrial Recovery 
Act (“NIRA”), which encouraged a centralization of both governmental 
and industrial power.49 Brandeis led the charge on the Supreme Court to 
strike down the NIRA in 1935, warning the White House that the Court 
would not tolerate continued centralization of business or governmental 
power.50 From 1935 until the beginning of World War II, the New Deal 
administration followed a policy of aggressively Brandeisian antitrust 
enforcement.51 Then, facing a need to mobilize big business for the war 
effort, the administration abruptly shifted course and embraced a model 
of partnership between big government and big business.52   
 
 46 Eugene V. Debs, A Study of Competition, Appeal to Reason, May 28, 1910, at 2, 
reprinted in Brett Flehinger, The 1912 Election and the Power of Progressivism 163 (2003).  
 47 Daniel Crane, Progressivism and the 1912 Election, in Crane & Hovenkamp, supra note 
18, at 104–05.  
 48 Id. at 106. 
 49 Hawley, supra note 23, at 43–46. 
 50 Shortly before voting to strike down the NIRA in the Schechter Poultry and Panama 
Refining decisions, Brandeis conveyed the following message to the White House: “This is 
the end of this business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell the President 
that we’re not going to let this government centralize everything. It’s come to an end.” Peter 
H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 104 (1982). 
 51 Hawley, supra note 23, at 360. 
 52 Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile, Antitrust in Wartime, Antitrust, Spring 2002, at 
72–73 (reporting the government’s suspension of major antitrust prosecutions during World 
War II). 
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After the war, the perception that industrial concentration in Germany 
and Japan had fueled the rise of fascism contributed to a two-decade 
period of intensive antitrust enforcement—particularly against 
mergers—launched by the Celler–Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950.53 
Here again, the ideology of the antimonopoly movement was ambiguous 
in conventional left–right terms. The antimonopolist Senator Kefauver 
warned that the consequence of further industrial concentration would 
be government takeover, and that could lead either to fascism, on the 
one hand, or socialism or communism, on the other.54 Other proponents 
of the act argued that the antitrust laws were “one of the greatest 
bulwarks against Communism,” and that the rising tide of industrial 
concentration was driving the country toward “collectivism.”55 It is no 
coincidence that the most anti-consolidationist statute in American 
history was passed during the period of the Red Scare. 
The ambiguity in the relationship between corporate scale and 
governmental scale has translated into a historical ambiguity in the 
politics of antitrust enforcement. Just as the two major contemporary 
political parties each blend contradictory Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian 
elements, so too antitrust ideology has not neatly tracked left–right 
dichotomies. On a statistical basis, civil antitrust enforcement by the 
government peaked during the conservative Nixon and Ford 
administrations.56 The Chicago School rode the wave of Ronald Reagan’s 
decoupling of the curse of bigness; bigness was a curse in the 
government only, not in business. But Chicago’s decoupling of the 
ideological aversion to large scale in government and business is not 
inevitable and may be, in historical perspective, anomalous. As historian 
Richard Hofstadter has written, American feelings about large 
organizational units in government and business have generally tracked 
in parallel: “From [America’s] colonial beginnings through most of the 
nineteenth century . . . Americans came to take it for granted that 
property would be widely diffused, that economic and political power 
would be decentralized.”57 The gradual public acceptance of the rise of 
 
 53 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051, 1053–54 
(1979).  
 54 96 Cong. Rec. 16,452 (1950) (statement of Sen. Kefauver). 
 55 Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
1, 25 (1982) (quoting House and Senate debates). 
 56 Daniel A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement 36–37 (2011). 
 57 Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement (1964), reprinted in 
Crane & Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 227. 
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big business in the twentieth century is attributable in part “to the 
emergence of countervailing bigness in government and labor.”58 
Historically, it is no anomaly that small-government conservatives 
would find common ground with Brandeisian progressives in resenting 
the growth and power of large-scale industrial firms, which are not so 
easily distinguished from large-scale governmental agencies. 
II. THE SHIFTING MEANING OF “MONOPOLY” AND CONTESTATION OVER 
ITS SOURCES 
A. What Is a “Monopoly?” 
The ideological valence of the antimonopoly principle is ambiguous 
in contemporary left–right terms, owing in large part to a historical shift 
in the meaning of the word “monopoly,” particularly in its popular and 
pejorative senses. Is a monopolist a private firm that corners a market 
through nefarious, shrewd tactics? If so, the law’s antimonopoly 
response codes “regulatory” and “interventionist” in left–right terms. Or 
is a “monopoly” a cronyist intervention by the state to prevent free-
market competition? In that case, the antimonopoly principle codes as 
“deregulatory” and “free market.” Both of these senses of “monopoly” 
have been used historically, and their contemporary manifestations 
remain tangled. 
The first sense of “monopoly”—of purely private market power—has 
a long-standing historical resonance. Legal regulation of private 
monopoly and unfair competition reportedly extends back as far as the 
Code of Hammurabi.59 A primordial antitrust case against grain dealers 
appears in fourth-century B.C. Athens.60 One finds an antimonopoly 
sentiment expressed in ninth-century B.C. Chinese thought, on the 
ground that monopolies increase prices to consumers.61 A similar 
sentiment appears in early Islamic law62 and in a fifth-century decree of 
 
 58 Id. at 238. 
 59 Fritz Machlup, The Political Economy of Monopoly: Business, Labor and Government 
Policies 185 (1952). 
 60 Lambros E. Kotsiris, An Antitrust Case in Ancient Greek Law, 22 Int’l Law. 451, 454–
55 (1988). 
 61 2 Chen Huan-Chang, The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School 535 
(1911). 
 62 Arvie Johan, Monopoly Prohibition According to Islamic Law: A Law and Economics 
Approach, 27 Mimbar Hukum 166, 167 (2015), https://perma.cc/24W9-V2BX (“Whoever 
withholds food (in order to raise its price), has certainly erred.” (citation omitted)).  
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the Byzantine Emperor Zeno and the Justinian Code.63 A generally 
moralist antimonopoly strand runs through the Christian tradition from 
the medieval scholastics to the Protestant reformers.64 The earliest 
common-law cases vitiating private monopolies date from the fourteenth 
century.65 
On the other hand, constitutional historians recognize a long-standing 
antimonopoly tradition—defined by such attributes as prohibitions on 
governmental cronyism and special grants of economic privilege—in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence.66 Debates over corporate chartering and 
monopoly pervaded the Founding era and continued through the 
Jacksonian period and into the corporate liberalizations of the late 
nineteenth century.67 Antimonopoly themes played an important role in 
many of the landmark cases of U.S. constitutional law on such matters 
as the limits of federal power,68 states’ impairment of contract 
obligations,69 and the reach of the Reconstruction Amendments.70 Indeed, 
the constitutional-democratic sense of the antimonopoly tradition 
predates the American political order, with deep roots in the British 
common law. Sir Edward Coke argued that all monopolies were against 
the Magna Carta because they stood against liberty and freedom,71 and 
the well-known British Case of Monopolies asserted parliamentary 
jurisdiction over the grant of monopolies.72 
 
 63 Code Just. 4.19.25, in 13 S. P. Scott, The Civil Law 120 (2d ed. 1932) (prohibiting 
monopolies and cartels upon pain of confiscation and banishment). 
 64 See Kenneth Elzinga & Daniel A. Crane, Christianity and Antitrust, in Daniel A. Crane 
& Samuel Gregg, Christianity and Economic Regulation (forthcoming Cambridge University 
Press) (on file with author). 
 65 William L. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 355, 356–58 (1954). 
 66 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: 
A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol’y 983, 985–86 (2013); Michael 
Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-
House Cases Re-Examined, 31 Emory L.J. 785, 789–90, 797–800 (1982); Kenneth Lipartito, 
The Antimonopoly Tradition, 10 U. St. Thomas L.J. 991, 991 (2013). 
 67 Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 1–5 (2008). 
 68 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 365, 378 (1819). 
 69 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 451–52 (1837).  
 70 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 64–66 (1872).  
 71 Edwardo Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning 
High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown and Criminal Causes 181 (1817).  
 72 Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies) (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1264–65, 11 Co. 
Rep. 84b, 86b–87b. 
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Throughout much of the Anglo-American antimonopoly tradition, 
“monopoly” primarily denoted a governmental grant of an exclusive 
privilege—a “letter patent” in the sense of the classic common-law case: 
The Case of Monopolies.73 Until the late nineteenth century, the 
American antimonopoly tradition was concerned primarily with 
governmental cronyism and exclusive privilege. As late as 1878, 
Thomas Cooley devoted the thrust of his essay on limits to state control 
of private business to the problem of state-granted monopoly, turning 
only in the last few pages to the subsidiary problem of “monopolies not 
created by the legislature.”74 
Over time, however, the primary legal meaning of “monopoly” has 
shifted from the government-granted to the purely private. This shift 
became apparent in U.S. antitrust law in 1943, when, in Parker v. 
Brown, the Supreme Court held the Sherman Act inapplicable to 
anticompetitive structures created by state regulation. 75 Parker grew out 
of the Supreme Court’s post-1937 constitutional jurisprudence rejecting 
Lochner-era judicial scrutiny of regulatory schemes impairing property 
or contract rights.76 Just as the post-1937 constitutional dispensation 
avoided second-guessing state regulatory judgments in favor of 
judicially preferred economic theories, so too the courts rejected efforts 
to use the Sherman Act to the same effect (to the dismay of 
conservatives, who favored the judiciary as a bulwark against over 
regulation).  
From one perspective, Parker turned the meaning of “monopoly” on 
its head.77 Whereas, the primary meaning of “monopoly” in the Anglo-
American tradition had been a governmental grant of exclusive 
 
 73 See Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 Yale L. J. 34, 44 (1937) 
(discussing a shift in meaning of the word “monopoly,” from “an exclusion of others from 
the market by a sovereign dispensation in favor of one seller” to a “broad sense of restriction 
of competition”). 
 74 Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, reprinted in Crane & 
Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 67. 
 75 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943). 
 76 Daniel A. Crane & Adam Hester, State-Action Immunity and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
115 Mich. L. Rev. 365, 370–73 (2016). 
 77 Richard A. Epstein, The Narrow Province of the Antitrust Laws, Or, Doing a Few 
Things Well, Presentation Before the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, (1997), in 9 
Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 113, 125 (“What happens [under Parker] is that this legal regime 
marks a complete inversion of the proper approach. State-sponsored cartels in the aftermath 
of the New Deal legitimation are more permanent and more dangerous than privately-
operated ones, but they are given complete immunity from the antitrust act.”). 
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privilege—an interference with the natural rights of other market 
participants—that primary sense of “monopoly” was now to be excluded 
altogether from the Sherman Act’s antimonopoly legal regime. Only 
purely private monopolies—the second sense of the word discussed 
above—would be covered by antitrust. 
The Parker doctrine of state-action immunity from antitrust has not 
developed to immunize state regulation from Sherman Act preemption 
as strongly as Parker’s language would suggest, and the doctrine’s 
evolution continues.78 In the push-and-pull over the doctrine’s 
boundaries, advocates of the Chicago School’s consumer-welfare 
approach have been the principal proponents of narrowing state-action 
immunity on the view that states systematically distort competitive 
processes for the benefit of rent-seekers.79 This simultaneously pro-
antitrust and deregulatory perspective tracks that strand of the 
antimonopoly tradition that blames the government for various 
problems.  
A. Are Private Monopolies the Product of Governmental Intervention? 
This ambiguity over the meaning of “monopoly” and its attendant 
legal and policy implications cashes out also in legal and economic 
discourse over the sources of monopoly power. A neoclassical economic 
view, today associated with Chicago School ideology, holds that 
markets are contestable and that any monopoly power gained through 
anticompetitive means is quickly eroded, but with one important 
exception: governmentally created entry barriers.80 If regulation and 
 
 78 Crane & Hester, supra note 76, at 365–76. 
 79 Id. at 366–70 (arguing for a more preemptive role for the FTC Act over anticompetitive 
state regulations that harm competition and consumer welfare); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, in Competition Laws in Conflict: Antitrust 
Jurisdiction in the Global Economy 189–213 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds., 
2004) (proposing a modification to Parker immunity doctrine to curb excesses of state 
anticompetitive regulation); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Chicago School and Exclusionary 
Conduct, 31 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 439, 446–47 (2008) (discussing Robert Bork’s concern 
about use of government as an agent of exclusion); Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, 
Introduction: The Intractable Problem of Antitrust Jurisdiction, in Competition Laws in 
Conflict, supra note 79, at 13 (describing the Parker doctrine as enabling mutual exploitation 
of citizens by the states). 
 80 See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, supra note 32 at 347–64 (examining predation through 
governmental process, which Bork described as a serious and growing problem); Milton 
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 129–31 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing the problem of 
government-created labor monopolies); Howard P. Marvel, Hybrid Trade Restraints: The 
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governmental favoritism are the only important sources of durable 
monopoly power, then one potential policy response is not to worry 
about privately acquired monopoly—essentially, to turn the Parker 
state-action immunity regime on its head and police only state-granted 
monopolies. But there is another possibility flowing from the opening 
premise, which is to hold that any observed instances of genuinely 
durable monopoly power must be owing to some seen or unseen 
governmental distortion. In this latter view, when what at first blush 
seems to be purely private monopoly power persists over time, there 
must be some underlying governmental distortion accounting for it. 
Then, even committed libertarians should favor antitrust intervention to 
terminate the monopoly. 
This view is not hypothetical; it explains some of the right’s historical 
affinity for antitrust enforcement despite the right’s otherwise laissez-
faire predilections. The clearest case in point is the 1982 consent decree 
breaking up AT&T.81 How did the largest antimonopoly corporate 
break-up in history occur at the hands of the Reagan Administration and 
its decidedly Chicago School Justice Department? The answer lies in 
Assistant Attorney General Bill Baxter’s conviction that AT&T was 
exploiting its status as a regulated monopolist to stifle competition.82 
What has come to be known as “Baxter’s law” posits that rate-regulated 
monopolists may extract monopoly profits from vertically integrated 
markets without running afoul of the “one monopoly profit” theorem.83 
Suspecting government regulation as the deep source of AT&T’s 
 
Legal Limits of a Government’s Helping Hand, 2 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 165, 180 (1983) 
(“Government may or may not be the source of all monopolies; it is clearly at the heart of a 
substantial number of monopolies.”); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: 
Lessons from the Controversy Over Railroad and Public Utility Rate Regulation, 70 Va. L. 
Rev. 187, 202–03 (1984) (examining the neoclassical view that only monopolies created by 
law are durable). 
 81 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). 
 82 Lawrence A. Sullivan & Ellen Hertz, The AT&T Antitrust Consent Decree: Should 
Congress Change the Rules?, 5 High Tech. L. J. 233, 238 (1990). 
 83 William F. Baxter, Conditions Creating Antitrust Concern with Vertical Integration by 
Regulated Industries––“For Whom the Bell Doctrine Tolls”, 52 Antitrust L. J. 243 (1983); 
see generally Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397, 403 (2009) (“The single monopoly profit 
theory holds that a firm with a monopoly in one product cannot increase its monopoly profits 
by using tying to leverage itself into a second monopoly in another product.”); Tim Wu, 
Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 Va. L. Rev. 123, 138–39 
(2006) (explaining that the doctrine described by William Baxter is referred to as Baxter’s 
Law). 
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persistent monopolistic behavior, the conservative Reagan 
Administration was willing to break it up. 
Similar suspicions that Big Tech companies, like Google and 
Facebook, are the monopolistic beneficiaries of subtle governmental 
cronyism show up today on the political right.84 That Big Tech tends to 
be associated politically with the Democratic Party only furthers these 
perceptions.85 Those inherently suspicious of governmental 
interventions in markets may understand Big Tech as the unnatural 
spawn of governmentally granted privilege and private greed. 
Conversely, those more sympathetic to governmental intervention may 
find nothing alarming about the multiple ways in which Big Tech 
appropriates governmental benefits through such vehicles as intellectual-
property law, government subsidies, or the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act. But these matters divide the left as well. The Open 
Markets Institute was forced out of the progressive-leaning New 
America Foundation over Open Markets’ criticisms of Google.86 In light 
of the contestable boundaries of the public–private divide and the 
shifting meaning of monopoly, it is not surprising to see political 
alliances fraying over antitrust reform.   
 
III. PRAGMATIC CONCERNS OVER ANTITRUST’S ALTERNATIVES AND 
CAPITALISM’S SURVIVAL 
A final reason that the politics of antitrust sometimes confound 
conventional left–right divides has to do with the pragmatic sense that 
some regulatory interventions may be necessary to preserve capitalism 
politically, and that antitrust may be the least objectionable one. This 
“antitrust or else” perspective has characterized the politics of antitrust 
from the beginning. 
The conventional view that Congress intended the Sherman Act to 
seriously undermine the trusts is balderdash. According to Professor 
 
 84 E.g., Seton Motley, Democrats Want Big Government Crony Socialism—Why Are 
Some Republicans Giving It to Them?, Red State (July 8, 2015, 10:13 AM), https://perma.cc 
/PVU7-39WD. 
 85 See Ryan Grim, Steve Bannon Wants Facebook and Google Regulated Like Utilities, 
The Intercept (July 27, 2017, 12:31 PM), https://perma.cc/TB99-MEB7; Farhad Manjoo, 
Silicon Valley’s Politics: Liberal, With One Big Exception, N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/silicon-valley-politics.html. 
 86 See supra note 1. 
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Merle Fainsod and Lincoln Gordon of Harvard University, “[T]he 
Republican Party, in control of the 51st Congress, was ‘itself dominated 
at the time by many of the very industrial magnates most vulnerable to 
real antitrust legislation.’”87 A more realistic view is that the 51st 
Congress passed the Sherman Act to avert more radical reforms. 
Speaking on the Senate floor in 1890, Senator John Sherman warned his 
brethren, many of whom were controlled by the trusts, that Congress 
“must heed [the public’s] appeal or be ready for the socialist, the 
communist, and the nihilist.”88 Sherman thus conceived of his 
eponymous antitrust statute as politically necessary to diffuse more 
radical political movements—as a sort of Band-Aid on capitalism.   
The idea that antitrust legislation and enforcement are necessary 
accommodations to public demand has a long pedigree in both 
conservative and more progressive circles. Writing in 1914, William 
Howard Taft described the Sherman Act as “a step taken by Congress to 
meet what the public had found to be a growing and intolerable evil.”89 
Notably, Taft did not own the public’s concern himself, nor did he 
attribute such a concern to Congress. Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt was 
relatively unconcerned with the trusts personally, but he “saw the trust 
problem as something that must be dealt with on the political level; 
public concern about it was too urgent to be ignored.”90   
Beyond the concern that, absent antitrust, capitalism itself might 
succumb to reformist pressures, there is a more modest possibility that, 
absent antitrust, political pressures would lead to overregulation. 
Antitrust and administrative regulation are conventionally viewed as 
alternatives to address market failures. From the Reagan Administration 
to the Financial Crisis of 2008, the overall arc of American law involved 
simultaneous deregulation and relaxation of antitrust enforcement. If 
popular dissatisfaction with the economic status quo grows, demand 
might grow to pull either the regulatory or antitrust lever. Those 
ideologically committed to a light governmental hand on the market 
might prefer the antitrust alternative. 
 
 87 William J. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Act: 1887–1890, 23 U Chi. L. Rev. 221, 
221 (1955) (quoting Merle Fainsod & Lincoln Gordon, Government and the American 
Economy 450 (1941)). 
 88 21 Cong. Rec. 2454, 2460 (1890). 
 89 William Howard Taft, The Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court 2 (1914). 
 90 Hofstadter, supra note 57, at 231–32. 
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It is hard to judge at any given moment how much political support 
for antitrust intervention is motivated by genuine concern over 
monopoly and competition, and how much of it derives from the fact 
that, in the face of popular demand for a governmental cure to a 
perceived evil, it is often easier to delegate the solution to antitrust than 
to propose a regulatory solution. From the Sherman Act forward, 
however, it is certain that antitrust has often been deployed as a foil to 
more interventionist forms of regulation. The ideological and political 
implications of that move are complex and not neatly housed in left–
right categories. 
CONCLUSION 
Antitrust is back on the menu. Given the ebb-and-flow patterns of 
antitrust enforcement in American history, that should come as no 
surprise. Nor should it be surprising that the pressures for enhanced 
antitrust enforcement are coming from both wings of the political 
spectrum, as is the defense of the incumbent consumer welfare regime. 
Despite the appearance of a conventional left–right divide over antitrust 
enforcement since the 1970s, in broader historical perspective the 
ideological lines over monopoly and competition are far less determined. 
 
